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Utopias [are to be] set alongside the constructions of en-
gineers, and one might with full justice call them con-
structions of social engineers…Utopias were relegated 
to the history of economic theory, whereas they belong 
to the theory itself, just as the construction of new bridg-
es and aeroplanes belong into the theory of civil or me-
chanical engineering. (Otto Neurath, 1919, 150-152) 
In September 2009, the editors of this special issue organized at Lau-
sanne University a Workshop on the History of Russian Political 
Economy and Statistics at the turn of the 20th century. When prepar-
ing a call for paper for this journal, the editors realized that papers 
presented at the Lausanne Workshop addressed implicitly or explicit-
ly questions about how to combine Economic Theory, Social Engi-
neering and Utopia. The contributions contained in this issue suggest 
various possible configurations between these three categories of sci-
entific inquiry. 
How can one define, understand and articulate these three catego-
ries? Very broadly, as far as socio-economic activities are concerned, 
economic theorizing refers to the use of hypothetico-deductive argu-
ments to explore actual and possible worlds, while social engineering 
is a set of social policies aiming at designing social changes to im-
prove social welfare and implement new worlds (economic policy is a 
form of social engineering). Finally, utopias may be understood as the 
blueprints for the social engineers’ action plans when these describe 
ideal possible worlds. The borders between three styles of economic 
discourses are porous and, more often than not, economists and re-
formers borrow to different styles. 
In Russia, free-market liberal authors—like Mikhail Reutern, Lev 
Nikolaevich Litoshenko or Boris Davidovich Brutzkus—as well as 
Marxian authors following strictly the Marx-Engels anti-utopian view 
of political economy—like Pavel Illich Popov and Isaak Illich Rubin—
all rejected utopian thinking as a fruitful way to develop economic 
theory and social engineering. Other liberal, heterodox Marxian or 
Bolshevik authors—like Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, Alexander Bog-
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danov or Alexander Chayanov—considered utopian thinking as a 
complement to economic theory and social engineering. 
The latter view is not specific to Russian and Soviet economics. In 
the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution, Otto Neurath, one of the 
founder of logical empiricism within the Vienna Circle, defended a 
similar complementary view of economic theory, social engineering 
and utopias, as illustrated by the epigraph to this foreword. Inspired 
by German planning techniques during World War I, Neurath’s early 
works offer some epistemological clarifications about how one may 
put together what appears to be the three sides of Russian Political 
Economy’s triangle: positive science explores real worlds (actual 
states of the world) as well as possible worlds (e.g. with counterfactual 
statements); as such, utopia is a scientific way to explore ideal possible 
worlds and is the blueprint for social reforms devised by social engi-
neers. Although controversial, this is one way to look at the role of 
utopia in political economy and economic policy. As a matter of fact, 
contributions and authors discussed in this double special issue1 offer 
various ways (from liberal-based reforms to socialist revolutionary 
methods) of combining utopia, economic theory and social engineer-
ing. This special issue aims at offering a fresh look at Russian political 
economy from the 1860s to the 1930s. We now supply the reader con-
textual and analytical introductory elements to the articles contained 
in this special issue. 
1. From Liberal Reforms (1862-1905) to Revolutionary 
Times (1905-1937) 
In the 1860s, inspired by a liberal vision, Tsar Alexander II (1818-
1881) inaugurated a period of political and economic reforms in the 
traditional, autocratic, Russian Empire. In the realm of individual 
rights, the abolition of serfdom in 1861 was a path-breaking reform. 
In the political and administrative realm, the establishment of provin-
cial (zemvstva, 1864) and municipal (duma, 1870) governments were a 
first step towards decentralisation. Interestingly, the zemstva hosted a 
provincial intelligentsia (Jasny, 1972, 36) which exhibited strong pro-
gressive views, “functioned as the centre of Russian liberal move-
ment” (see Kojima in this issue), and developed hostility towards 
authoritarianism. In the economic sphere, reforms were initiated to 
modernise and industrialise the national economy, develop railroads, 
and stimulate foreign trade. 
This era of change paved the way for an entirely new spirit of pas-
sionate debates in Russia. Social reformers from all obedience nur-
tured the public discussion. There were romantic agrarians, fierce 
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industrialists, anarcho-terrorists, non-Marxist socialists, Marxist so-
cialists, non-socialist Marxists, populists, protectionists, liberals, and 
so forth. These debates criss-crossed the whole period from the end of 
Imperial Russia to the Soviet Russia of the 1920s.  
Reformers, whether conservative, progressive, or revolutionary, 
used various categories of discourse to make their point. 
2. Categories of Economic Discourses: Utopia, Political 
Economy, Social Engineering 
As early as 1872, in The Demons2, Fyodor Dostoyevsky offered a spell-
binding picture of the passionate and unstable atmosphere of the time 
as well as the complex and intricate ranges of discourses from Utopia 
to Political Economy. Shigalov, one of the characters, is presenting his 
social ideas at a meeting:  
“Dedicating my energies to the study of the social organization which is in 
the future to replace the present condition of things, I’ve come to the con-
viction that all makers of social systems from ancient times up to the pre-
sent year, 187-, have been dreamers, tellers of fairy-tales, fools who con-
tradicted themselves, who understood nothing of natural science and the 
strange animal called man. Plato, Rousseau, Fourier, columns of alumini-
um, are only fit for sparrows and not for human society. But, now that we 
are all at last preparing to act, a new form of social organization is essen-
tial. In order to avoid further uncertainty, I propose my own system of 
world-organisation. Here it is”. He tapped the notebook. “I wanted to ex-
pound my views to the meeting in the most concise form possible, but I 
see that I should need to add a great many verbal explanations, and so the 
whole exposition would occupy at least ten evenings, one for each of my 
chapters” (There was the sound of laughter.) “I must add, besides, that my 
system is not yet complete.” (Laughter again.) “I am perplexed by my own 
data and my conclusion is a direct contradiction of the original idea with 
which I start. Starting from unlimited freedom, I arrive at unlimited des-
potism. I will add, however, that there can be no solution to the social 
problem but mine.” (Dostoyevsky, [1872] 2005, 390-391) 
In this speech, Dostoyevsky sketched both, on the one hand, the intri-
cate epistemological intimacy between science, social engineering and 
utopia and, on the other, the pitfalls and paradoxes one can fall into 
when dealing with ideal worlds, e.g. absolute despotism while aim-
ing at unlimited freedom. These are the very topic of this special is-
sue. 
As the papers in this collection demonstrate, Russian economists 
articulated in various ways two different categories: political econo-
my and utopia. Political economy was either considered as comple-
mentary, in opposition or unrelated to utopia. For example, Russian 
Marxists criticized some socialist doctrines for being utopian, i.e. non-
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scientific.3 Conversely, socialism was also qualified by the liberal cri-
tiques4 as a foolish utopia or, after the 1917 October revolution, as an 
unsustainable utopia. On the contrary, some authors like Tugan-
Baranovsky5 considered utopia as a branch of scientific enquiry or at 
least advocated some complementarity between the two discourses. 
3. Liberal View of Utopia and Political Economy: Economic 
Policy as Social Engineering 
Russian authorities long tolerated the idyllic and utopian populist 
vision of a traditional agrarian society. But with the advent of more 
powerful European countries, this “naïve” posture could no longer 
stand up to reality: Russia was an economically backward country. 
The 1867 Memorandum on tariff reform by the Russian finance minister 
Mikhail Kristoforovich Reutern (1862-1878), published here for the 
first time in English, is a testimony of this liberal and industrialist 
turn, which was carried on by subsequent finance ministers, notably 
Sergei Yulyevich Witte (from 1892 to 1903). Barnett’s paper on Reu-
tern’s Memorandum offers new insights on the role of foreign trade 
and tariffs as major economic policy instruments—not to say social 
engineering tools—in Russian economic development during the 
1860s and 1870s. As Barnett argues, in the spirit of Alexander II’s lib-
eral reforms, Reutern defended enthusiastically free trade against 
“the ideas of the German historical school [which] were beginning to 
be extensively promoted” in Russia. 
Alongside these economic reforms, political changes were more 
gradual. The authorities felt endangered by the freedom of speech 
and therefore maintained a strong censorship on all writings of dis-
turbing character: if not repressed, socialism was certainly frowned 
upon. In 1881 the mayor of Moscow, Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin, 
was dismissed for being much too liberal in the political sphere and 
was sent back home to rule the zemstvo in his native Tombov. Exiles 
in provinces were a common practice, which was one reason for the 
progressive orientation of many zemstva. The role of the zemstvo stat-
isticians after the Bolshevik revolution and their liberal and anti-
autocratic positions against the Bolsheviks, is recalled in Akhabbar’s 
contribution: the Central Statistical Administration (TsSU), created in 
1918 as the merger of decentralized zemstvo statistical units, actually 
hosted great liberal economists and statisticians like P.I. Popov, L. N. 
Litoshenko or V. G. Mikhaïlovskij. TsSU was rightly qualified by S. G. 
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Wheatcrof (1997, 18) as “the last branch of the provisional govern-
ment to fall” at the end of the NEP. 
Kojima also reminds us that the liberal movement did not end 
with the 1917 revolution. He highlights the works of two major Rus-
sian liberal economists during the inter-war period: Brutzkus and 
Litoshenko. Although Brutzkus’ free-market liberal vision has been 
positively acknowledged by Hayek in Collectivist Economic Planning 
(1935), his economic work has not been thoroughly studied yet. Koji-
ma’s article fills this gap concerning Brutzkus. Litoshenko’s views on 
liberal economic development are even less well known. While both 
the populists and most of the liberal economists were favourable to 
the traditional rural community (the mythic commune, mir, ob-
shchina), Litoshenko and Brutzkus were among the few liberal au-
thors providing a critique of the commune, supporting in this sense 
the reforms initiated during the end of Imperial Russia by the prime 
minister Stolypin (who was assassinated by opponents to these very 
same reforms). Even during the Soviet period, Litoshenko (in Russia) 
and Brutzkus (since 1922 in exile) were still developing arguments 
against the commune. For them, the collective property of land was 
not suitable to stimulate economic growth, due to its lack of incen-
tives. Since they believed in market and private property as the pillars 
of future industrialisation and of economic development, they fa-
voured the advent of the NEP during the 1920s. This vision, however, 
which could well be accommodated within the NEP, did not survive 
the collectivisation turn in the end of the 1920s in the USSR. Both au-
thors thought that any collectivist organisation was doomed to fail-
ure. As Kojima puts it, “they could not have imagined that the Soviet 
system could really last for such a long time, about half a century 
after their deaths.” But, in fact, it was their liberal vision within the 
USSR that revealed itself, in the end, a utopia.6 
4. Utopia Belongs to Science and Political Economy 
Tugan-Baranovsky adopted a very different attitude towards utopia. 
For the Russian economist, often compared in Russia to Alfred Mar-
shall in terms of influence, science and utopia are complementary. 
Marx provided a comprehensive and scientific critique of capitalism, 
but refused to offer a description of the future organisation of the 
society under socialism; or, as Engels put it, speculations about future 
ideal society are mere utopia. For Tugan-Baranovsky, “The opposi-
tion of science and utopia is untenable.” (Tugan, 1912, quoted by Al-
lisson in this issue) Indeed, he suggested a conception of the ideal 
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socialist society, based on elements he gathered in the utopian litera-
ture as well as in political economy. He reached thus conclusions on 
the best way of organising production, through planning, distribution 
of labour, and income distribution. As documented by Allisson, 
Tugan-Baranovsky achieved his objective in an original way. His idea 
of socialism incorporates elements of Marxian analysis of production 
and value, Kant’s ethics regarding the place of human being in the 
economy, and subjectivist evaluations through the concept of mar-
ginal utility, in order to define the optimal allocation of resources. 
Thus, in Tugan-Baranovsky’s ideas on socialism, utopia is not merely 
a dream: it belongs in its own right and directly contributes to theo-
retical political economy. Although there is no material evidence of a 
link between Barone and Tugan-Baranovsky, the two approaches 
offer striking similarities, following rather different paths: a Walraso-
Paretian general equilibrium model vs. a Kantian Marxo-Mengerian 
synthesis. On this point, the socialist calculation debate assumed the 
same epistemological relationship Tugan-Baranovsky shaped be-
tween utopia and science. Indeed, as stated earlier, Neurath, when 
launching in 1919 what would become the socialist calculation de-
bate, stated that science is not only about actual facts, but also about 
possible worlds, including ideal possible states, i.e. utopias. 
Chayanov, the eminent agrarian Russian economist, showed yet 
another way of accommodating utopia and political economy; as he 
wrote himself a literary utopian novel and a high-technology utopian 
essay (called “peasant utopia” and “scientific utopia” by Raskov) 
besides his more “regular” economic works. These three kinds of 
works answer three different classes of problems, as Raskov explains. 
Political economy explains the relations at work in the capitalist socie-
ty, in the peasant family-based economy, and in the cooperatives. 
Scientific utopia explores the possible future worlds in terms of tech-
nological progress and speculates to what extent humankind may 
escape the burden of material needs. The peasant utopia is best at 
addressing a full range of issues Chayanov ponders about the future 
organisation of society: how to reconcile socialist and capitalist modes 
of production to retain the advantages of both régimes, i.e. questions 
of incentives, of an unavoidable existence of a ruling class, of the sur-
vival of the family, of the ideal relationship between mass production 
and fine arts according to the ideal conception of society, etc.? Cha-
yanov’s example is not isolated. Utopias were flourishing, especially 
in times of radical change and revolutions, and a handful of Russian 
economists, even Bolsheviks, wrote utopias to address economic is-
sues at different levels. 
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5. Soviet Russia, or Utopia Terminated? 
Though Marx and Engels condemned the making of imaginary ideal 
future worlds as non-scientific and foolish utopias, in Soviet Russia, 
Marxists and Bolsheviks authors did not refer to the Utopian genre in 
such an unambiguous way.7  
Alexander Bogdanov’s Red Star, published in 1908, and Engineer 
Menny, published in 1912, are probably the most famous Bolshevik 
utopias. Besides fantastic aspects of these works, utopian works are 
full of possible social engineering devices, like for instance Bog-
danov’s statistical organization: 
The Institute of Statistics has agencies everywhere, which keep track of the 
flow of goods into and out of the stockpiles and monitor the productivity 
of all enterprises and the changes in their work forces. In that way it can 
be calculated what and how much must be produced for any given period 
and the number of man-hours required for the task. The Institute then 
computes the difference between the existing and the desired situation for 
each vocational area and communicates the result to all places of em-
ployment. Equilibrium is soon established by a stream of volunteers. 
(Bogdanov, [1908] 1984, 66) 
Here, Bogdanov featured a non-coercive and decentralized economic 
organization where the Institute of Statistics would collect, publicize 
and spread the information so as the system would equilibrate in an 
automatic way and on a free-choice-based allocation of labour. 
During the early years of the revolution (1917-1921), several Bol-
shevik authors produced works that can be considered as utopian 
like, for instance, Bukharin and Preobrajensky’s ABC of Communism 
which contains both a scientific Marxist critique of capitalism and of 
its forthcoming collapse, as well as a description of what would be an 
ideal (stateless) communist society. The reader shall be reminded 
Soviet Russia’s peculiar atmosphere in the 1920s: a utopia-friendly 
epoch, a time full of promises… as well as threats as several authors 
noticed like Evgeni Zamyatin in his dystopia, We (1921), who echoed, 
half a century later, Dostoevsky’s prophecies: “Starting from unlim-
ited freedom, I arrive at unlimited despotism.” (Already quoted) The 
fact remains that, as Richard Stites (1989) stated, the 1920s “provided 
a hospitable political, social, and cultural context” to the flourishing 
of “future speculation and living experimentation” so as “in the 
1920s, some Bolshevik leaders wanted to and tried to rein in the “uto-
pian” elements” (1989, 225). Several attempts to implement utopian-
like devices in social and economic life were sometimes led by artists 
like, for instance, Alexaï Gastev. Inspired by Taylor’s engineer-based 
approach of social division of labour, in 1920 Gastev created a school 
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of social engineering in Ukraine and, in 1921, he founded with Len-
in’s support the Central Institute for Labour (CIL). With the help of 
other artists like Ippolit Sokolov and Kasimir Malevich, Gastev’s CIL 
aimed at improving significantly the productivity of labour and effi-
ciency in every spheres of life thanks to scientific management tech-
niques where science was in the service of utopian views of society. 
Like in many industrialist utopian works of the time, he believed in 
the possibility of a dramatic rise of labour productivity. His views on 
human labour were based on a man-machine metaphor focused on 
bodies’ discipline and the management of the labourer’s energy. Gas-
tev coined the word “biomechanics” to talk about human bodies as 
bio-mechanisms (see Heller and Nekrich 1986, Stites 1989, and Vain-
gurt 2008). According to Gastev: 
It is necessary to be a kind of engineer; it is necessary to be an experienced 
social constructor and to take one’s scientific methods not from general pre-
suppositions regarding the development of productive forces, but from a 
most exact molecular analysis of the new production, which has brought 
into existence the contemporary proletariat… (quoted in Bailes 1977, 377, 
our emphasis) 
Gastev apparently employed the term “social engineer” in a non-
metaphoric way but considered social life as a field to be studied and 
mastered by engineers rather than social scientists—while Neurath 
gave room to the latter and, after him, in Western Europe, several 
users of the term, e.g. Jacob Marschak (1941) and Ragnar Frisch 
(1970). 
In Soviet Russia, the expression “social engineer” usually assumed 
to get rid of bourgeois social sciences and, from this tabula rasa, to 
raise a new science based on engineers’ knowledge and methodology. 
Alongside the mechanist metaphor and the disciplinary view of 
society, other utopias referred to a non-coercive and egalitarian socie-
ty. A popular metaphor was the one of the society organized like a 
“conductorless orchestra.” Tough it came to be literally implemented 
in music with the creation of the so-called Persimfans (the First Sym-
phonic Orchestra without a Conductor), this metaphor was also pop-
ular in revolutionary discourse (Stites 1989, 135-139). Bukharin used 
this metaphor of an egalitarian-based society when describing—in a 
way close to Bogdanov’s vision in Red Star (quoted above)—the ideal 
communist society’s statistical organization. In the forthcoming so-
cialist society,  
The main direction will be entrusted to various kinds of book-keeping of-
fices or statistical bureaux. There, from day to day, account will be kept of 
production and all its needs; there also it will be decided whither workers 
must be sent, whence they must be taken, and how much work there is to 
be done. And inasmuch as, from childhood onwards, all will have been 
accustomed to social labour, and since all will understand that this work is 
necessary and that life goes easier when everything is done according to a 
prearranged plan and when the social order is like a well-oiled machine, 
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all will work in accordance with the indications of these statistical bu-
reaux. There will be no need for special ministers of State, for police and 
prisons, for laws and decrees—nothing of the sort. Just as in an orchestra 
all the performers watch the conductor’s baton and act accordingly, so 
here all will consult the statistical reports and will direct their work ac-
cordingly. (Bukharin, [1919] 1968, 70) 
In his contribution Akhabbar focuses on the making of a Soviet statis-
tical organization in the first decade of the revolution. His article 
deals with the construction by P.I. Popov of a centralized statistical 
organization, the Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie (TsSU or CSU). 
Of course, at the time, publication of statistical information in order to 
reach socio-economic equilibrium through the voluntary moves of 
economic actors was not considered. Instead, Popov struggled at the 
head of the TsSU to simply gather enough information to produce as 
good and objective a statistical information as possible. With his col-
leagues from former zemstvo statistical units, often liberal and anti-
communist, like Litoshenko and Mikhaïlovskij, and attached to a sci-
entific methodology based on international standards, he defended as 
long as he could the TsSU’s independence toward central power as 
well as against the normative perspective of Gosplan. Regarding his 
relationships with revolutionary Bolsheviks, Popov had to justify his 
so-called geneticist approach, against the revolutionary view of sci-
ence. According to the former, the social economy is depicted as it 
actually is—using statistics and economic categories; according to the 
latter, in a socialist economy, the categories of political economy 
(prices, value, money, commodities, etc.) no more stand under the 
dictatorship of proletariat implemented by the October revolution, 
and statistical analysis should resume to accounting and prescriptive 
tables instead of TsSU’s descriptive tables, balance sheets, and time 
series. Here, the scientific view of statistics and political economy was 
struggling with revolutionary views of science as illustrated notably 
by E.A. Preobranjensky, G.M. Krzhizhanovski or S.G. Strumilin. 
Akhabbar shows that the latter defended a view of the “social engi-
neer” different from Neurath’s, i.e. unrelated to a positivist idea of 
political economy and statistics but based on a revolutionary view of 
society in which what matters is to set ambitious goals rather than 
study the positive laws that rule the social economy. At the end of the 
1920s, the descriptive-oriented TsSU was absorbed by the prescrip-
tive-oriented Gosplan; hence, the revolutionary view of economics 
and statistics eventually won the day by imposing a prescriptive ra-
ther than a descriptive methodology.  
As shown by Lallement in his contribution, these debates about 
the social engineers’ almost unlimited possibilities of action—limited 
only by the laws of Nature and Physics—raised serious issues not 
only regarding statistical organization but also the general Soviet 
doctrine and the specific political economy of (Soviet) socialism. In-
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deed, in 1936 Stalin ordered to prepare an official manual of political 
economy. The resulting work, published only in 1954 as the Manual of 
Political Economy, is both far from the almost-utopian writings of the 
years 1917-1921 by Bukharin and Preobranjenski, or the voluntarist 
and optimistic views of Trotsky, Preobranjensky, Krzhizhanovski or 
Strumilin about the Soviet industrial policy. Though Soviet economic 
planning could be credited with impressive results in heavy industry 
and military branches and, from WWII on, indisputable military suc-
cess symbolized by the storming of Berlin in April 1945, Soviet policy-
makers could not ignore the disappointing results in agriculture and 
more generally in consumption goods industries. Lallement explains 
that one of the task of the Manual was to exonerate the Soviet leaders 
from their failures by imputing the fault onto so-called universal laws 
of the economy… Because of the ‘universal economic laws’, one can-
not blame the Party for the disappointing results of the Soviet econo-
my but rather blame the economic laws ruling whatever the underly-
ing modes of production.8 This is why Lallement calls Stalin’s Soviet 
economic doctrine (as expressed in the 1954 Manual of Political Econo-
my), both a reasonable–not to say constrained—utopia, i.e. a picture of an 
ideal possible world—rooted in inescapable economic laws—, and a 
disenchanted worldview. 
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